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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------------------MELVIN H. JENSEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MAJ."ULA CORPORATION OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER DAY SAINTS, a corporation sole, and JOHN
TINKER and GENEVIEVE L.
TINKER, his wife,

Case No.

14806

Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from a judgment in favor of
respondent relative to a sale of property on contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant moved the lower court for a summary
judgment, which was denied.

Thereafter, respondents'

Complaint and appellant's Counterclaim were tried without
a jury before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock on June 17,
1976, at which time the lower court held in favor of res-

pendent on the issue of breach of contract and attorney's
fees, limited respondents' claim for damages to OclE DOLLAR
($1.00), and denied appellant's Counterclaim.

** *

* * *
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court
decision and further seeks the granting of appellant's
Counterclaim.

In the alternative, appellant seeks modi-

fication of the judgment on the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November l, 1965, appellant and respondent
entered into a contract for the sale of property belonging
to appellant located in Manila, Utah.

The property des-

cribed in the contract, shown as being one huncired feet
oy one hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.), was mat
property to which appellant held record title on the date
of the contract.

Prior to November 1, 1965, there had

been an exchange of Quitclaim Deeds between appellant and
defendants TINKER which cleared up certain boundary
problems but which did not change the size of the property
to which appellant held record title.
After the signing of the con tract on i~ovember
1, 1965, respondent took possession of the property and

immediately began plans for the erection of tourist
acco:m.'llodations on the premises.
prepared certain drawings.

For this purpose he

(Tr. 36)

(For purpose of the

trial the drawings were marked as Exhibit 2.)

The only

part of the plans completed was the remodeling of the
building already on the premises.

(Tr. 24.)

* **

* * *
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Respondent was very slow in making any payments,
beginning with the payment due a year after the contract
was signed (Defendant'.s Request for Admissions, Ex. F).
All of the subsequent payments were late (Defendant's

Request for Admissions, Ex. G, H, I, L, and T) and the
final payment was never paid to appellant but was tendered
into court at the time of the filing of the

Prior to any legal action by respondent,

complaint.

appellant served proper notices on respondent requiring
him to vacate the premises, which respondent failed to do.

Respondent then brought action in the lower court against
appellant and other defendants.

The claim directed

against appellant was that the contract should be reformed
to show the property covered by the contract to include
all the property within certain fence lines, which included
property to which appellant had no record title.
On December 15, 1975, appellant moved the court
for summary judgment, based largely on the parol evidence
rule.

Oral argi.:.ment was heard and the motion was denied.

Thereafter the case was tried without a jury.
Judgment was

en~ered

in the lower court ordering

appellant to convey to respondent by warranty deed all
the property in question, including property belonging
to

def~ndant

TINKERS.

In addition the court awarded res-

pondent ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) in damages, attorney's fees,
and costs.
-3-
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
PAROL EVIDENCE IS BARRED IF THE DESCRIPTION OF
THE PROPERTY TO BE CONVEYED IS DEFINITE, CERTAIN, AND
UNAMBIGUOUS.
The law in Utah is clear that where there is
no ambiguity in the document conveying property regarding
the description of the premises to be conveyed, "extrinsic
evidence cannot be introduced to show that it was the
intention of the granter to convey a different tract or
that he did not intend to convey all of the land described."
Percival vs. Cooper, 525 P. 2d 41 (Utah 1974).
Applying that test to the facts in question, it

is immediately apparent that there was no ambiguity in the
description of the property to be conveyed.

Not only was

the description of the property exactly one hundred feet
by one hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.), but it
also showed an exact starting point and ending point.
In fact, the contract exactly described all of the property
to which the appellant had record title in the immediate
area.

There fore, it was error on the part of the lower

court to deny appellant's motion for sununary judgment
since the case, as i t stood before the court at the time
of the motion, showed the respondent not entitled to any
more property than that specifically described in the
contract.
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POINT TWO
REFORMATION OF A CONTRACT CAN OCCUR ONLY WHERE
THERE IS MUTUAL MISTAKE OR WHERE THERE IS FRAUD.
Even admitting for sake of argument that the
lower court had a right to allow parol evidence to be
admitted for the purpose of determining whether the contract in question could be reformed, there was no evidence which would permit reformation.

The law is quite

clear that reformation can only occur, if at all, where
there is mutual mistake or where there is mistake on one
side and fraud on the other.

Powell on Real Property,

Vol. 6, ,!903; Simmons Creek Coal Company vs. Duran, 142
U.S.

417, 12 Sup. Ct. 239, 335 L. Ed. 1063; Janke vs.

Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247, 332 P. 2d 933 (1958).

The lower

court found no evidence of fraud on behalf of appeliant.
Therefore, the only question is whether the evidence
showed that there was mutual mistake as to the property
to be included in the sale by appellant to respondent.
It is true that there was a little bit of confusion regarding the exact property belonging to the
appellant prior to the execution of the contract in question.

Nevertheless, the testimony is clear that prior to

the signing of the contract on November 1, 1965, the
appellant had clarified its title to its property by
exchanging Quitclaim Deeds with defendants TINKER.

(Tr. 75.)

Moreover, at no time did appellant's corporation sole or
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

any of its representatives ever intend on selling more
property than was owned by appellant in this particular
area.

In fact the testimony of the corpora ti on sole was

that at the time of the sale he looked up the deed on the
property before even posting a "for sale" sign and determined, based on the measurements on the ground, that
appellant owned a third of an acre.

(Tr. 73.)

One hundrec

feet by one hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.) equals
fifteen thousand (15,000) square feet, or a little more
than one-third acre.

If the property had included every-

thing within the fence lines, as contended by respondent,
the property would have been closer to one-half acre.
The corporation sole further testified he told the realtor
with whom the property was listed that a survey would
have to be taken to establish the property boundaries.
(Tr. 73.}

Obviously, there would be no need for a survey

if the property included everything within the fence lines
as alleged by the respondents.
The corporation sole's testimony is clear that
he knew there was no more than a third of an acre to be
sold.

(Tr. 7 4.)

The real tor also knew that the sale

involved a third acre of land and he prepared the earnest
money receipt which describes the property as "approx.
1/3. acre."

(Tr . 3 7 , 6 3 . )

The appellant coul d no t intend

to sell more property than i t owned.

Hence, there

was no mistake by the appellant as to the property
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it was selling.

Moreover, it would have been a simple

thing for respondent to verify the property description
before signing the purchase agreement.

Therefore, there

was no basis to attempt reformation of the contract in
question.
POINT THREE
RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES AND THEREFORE
CAl.~OT

SEEK EQUITABLE ACTION.

At the outset of the trial, counsel for appellant
asked for and was granted an amendment to appellant's
answer in order to allege the affirmative defense of laches.
This amendment was granted by the court without
of the opposing counsel.

obj~ction

(Tr. 6.)

Since the respondents' claim sounds in equity,
appellant is free to assert the defense of laches.
Am

Jur 2d, Equity, §152 et. seq.

27

It is clear that the res-

pondent is not the ordinary purchaser of property but
rather a developer of land.

(Tr. 14, 16, 43;) · Testimony

is that shortly after the signing of the contract on
November 1, 1965, respondent personally measured the
property in order to determine how best to improve the
property in question.

(Tr. 36.)

Those measurements,

as shown on Exhibit 2, indicate dimensions of one hundred
twenty-nine feet by one hundred twenty-three feet ( 129 ft.
x 123 ft.).

The critical dimension is that of the frontage

Which the respondent shows as being one hundred twenty-nine
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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feet (129 ft.) and which in the contract is only one
hundred feet (100 ft.) .

Respondent claims he made no

measurements of the property prior to actually acquiring
property by contract but there is no question that the
measurements of the property shortly after the date of
the contract put the respondent on notice that there was
some problem with the property he thought he was receiving.
In addition, respondent testified that when he placed a
trailer on the South thirty-two feet (S. 32 ft.) of the
property, defendant TINKER informed him that that property
did not belong to respondent but rather to defendant
TINKER and that respondent was to have his trailer moved.
This occurred in approximately 1968 as testified to by
respondent.

(Tr. 24-25.)

Appellant had to constantly

remind respondent to make payments and yet nothing was
ever mentioned to ?PPellant by the way of any problem
until 1969.

(Tr. 2 8.)

Nevertheless, even knowing that

there was a problem in 1968 and certainly by 1969,
appellant took no action to bring any lawsuit until 1975
at a time after he had received the second notice from
appellant evicting him from the property in question.
The testimony is therefore clear that respondent was most
dilatory in trying to resolve the problem.

He could have

and should have made appellant aware of his confusion
·

as to the boundaries of the property prior to the sign
of the contract on November l, 1965.

ing

In any case, h e should
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have done something no later than approximately 1966
or early 1967.

Certainly the respondent knew of the

problem or should have known of the problem long before
any money had been invested in the remodeling of the
old church.

His failure to act promptly should now be

the basis upon which this Court denies any recovery.
POINT FOUR
IN THE

ALTERl~ATIVE,

APPELLANT SHOULD ONLY HAVE

TO QUITCLAIM PROPERTY TO WHICH IT DOES NOT HAVE TITLE.
In the Court's mell¥)randurn decision, it found
that defendant TINKER was not a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice and that his interest in the property
in question "is inferior to the plaintiffs."

There was

nothing in the memorandum decision which indicated that
appellant became fee title holder to any property other
than that to which it had record title.

Therefore, the

judgment that the appellant "convey by good and sufficient
warranty deed the real property described in the last
preceding paragraph, free and clear of all encumbrances,"
is an unfair and inproper burden upon appellant.

Appel-

lant has never received fee title to the property and can
do nothing more than quitclaim the property in dispute
to respondent.

In the event this Court should find that

respondent is entitled to have from appellant

sone deed

of conveyance of the property to which defendants TINKER
holds title, then the j udgrnen t of the lower court should
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be modified to reflect that as to that property to
which it does not hold title, appellant need only give
a Quitclaim Deed and the title insurance need only
cover that property to which it holds title.
POINT FIVE
UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, RESPONDENT IS NOT
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
It was respondent's failure to make timely
payment that brought about the need for appellant to
serve an eviction notice and declare a forfeiture.
Respondent had every opportunity to make all the necessary payments and then bring action for title to any
additional property he thought he had right to have.
His own failure to make appropriate payment was the
default which caused the difficulty.

As a consequence,

because of that breach, respondent is not entitled to
attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
This Court has on numerous occasions upheld
a vendor's right to terminate a contract upon its breach
by the purchaser and to declare a forfeiture of that prop;:·
See, e.g., Jensen vs. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485, P.
673 (l9 7l) •

20

The respondent in this action gave ample

justification to appellant to declare such a forfeiture.
The terms of the contract, including the property description and payment dates, were very clear.
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Respondent '

was experienced in the field of real estate and fully
knew the consequences of non-payment.

This Court should

therefore remand this case back to the lower court and
order it to deny respondent's Complaint and to grant
appellant's Counterclaim.

In the alternative, this

court should deny respondent attorney fees and should
require that as to property to which appellant has no
record title it be required only to quitclaim such
property to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,

KIRTO~N,
McCONK:;_ ~YLE
Jo ep
A tor

st
Appellant
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